The author reflects on the moral attitudes displayed by Poles fighting in the Warsaw Uprising. He believes that the sacrifice and selflessness with which Varsovians battled for their city had its roots in the general mentality of the Poles, who for generations had been raised in the spirit of “mutual and willing endowment”. He also notes that the noble ideals of the wartime generations have today been largely replaced by mercenary selfishness.

Let I be an ideal of subsets of a Polish space X, containing all singletons and possessing a Borel basis. Assuming that I does not satisfy ccc, we consider the following conditions (B), (M) and (D). Condition (B) states that there is a disjoint family F $\subseteq$ P(X) of size c, consisting of Borel sets which are not in I. Condition (M) states that there is a Borel function f: X → X with $f^{-1}[\{x\}] \not\in$ I for each x ∈ (...) X. Provided that X is a group and I is invariant, condition (D) states that there exist a Borel set B $\not\in$ I and a perfect set P $\subseteq$ X for which the family $\{B + x: x \in P\}$ is disjoint. The aim of the paper is to study whether the reverse implications in the chain (D) $\Rightarrow$ (M) $\Rightarrow$ (B) $\Rightarrow$ not-ccc can hold. We build a σ-ideal on the Cantor group witnessing (M) & ¬ (D) (Section 2). A modified version of that σ-ideal contains the whole space (Section 3). Some consistency results on deriving (M) from (B) for "nicely" defined ideals are established (Sections 4 and 5). We show that both ccc and (M) can fail (Theorems 1.3 and 5.6). Finally, some sharp versions of (M) for invariant ideals on Polish groups are investigated (Section 6). (shrink)

The article attempts to characterize three key doctrinal controversies in the Carolingian Renaissance, namely: the disputes over the Eucharist, the so-called trina deitas, and predestination. The core of the article is an exposition of the controversy concerning predestination, whose main protagonist is Gottschalk of Orbais. The article discusses four crucial issues related to the problem: (i) the concept of God, (ii) the understanding of grace, nature and free will, (iii) the relation of foreknowledge to predestination, and (iv) the doctrine of (...) redemption, i.e., specifically the relationship betweenjustice and mercy. The article is largely an attempt at an interpretation of the texts of the epoch, mainly those of Gottschalk of Orbais and his adversary, Hincmar of Reims. The conclusions point to difficulties in the issues discussed and outline what attempts at solving this problem have taken place in the coming centuries. (shrink)

Argumentem indukcyjnym w retoryce jest paradygmat ; paradygmat jednak nie polega na przechodzeniu od wielu szczegółowych przypadków do pewnego uogólnienia, czyli uniwersalizacji wszystkich poszczególnych przypadków — jak normalnie w argumentacji z indukcji — lecz jest przejściem od jednego szczegółu do szczegółu innego, podobnego, przy czym wymaganym warunkiem jest to, że jeden i drugi konkretny przypadek należą do tego samego rodzaju. Paradygmat zatem nie jest indukcją w znaczeniu ścisłym, ale wydaje się bardziej spełniać warunki analogii. W artykule zostaje sformułowana teza, że (...) u Arystotelesa występują trzy rodzaje wnioskowań: dedukcja, indukcja i wnioskowanie z przykładu; dla zaprezentowania specyfiki wnioskowania przez paradygmat są także analizowane różne typy wnioskowań, tzn. sylogizm apodeiktyczny, dialektyczny, indukcyjny, aby na tym tle wykazać odrębność wnioskowań przez paradygmat, które wydają się być pewnym rodzajem analogii. Prezentowany więc artykuł jest próbą podania charakterystyki i specyfiki argumentacji przez paradygmat u Arystotelesa w świetle jego Retoryki oraz pism logicznych. (shrink)

W artykule najpierw w kilku zdaniach przedstawiam główne tezy Ajdukiewicza teorii pytań, następnie krótko prezentuję zasadnicze tezy książki Jonkisza oraz niewątpliwe zalety tej pracy. Następnie przedstawię moje zastrzeżenia co do pewnych rozstrzygnięć teoretycznych przyjętych przez Autora, a mianowicie założenia, że osnowy pytań są ciągiem składników bez żadnych wymagań składniowych, założenia o szczególnym charakterze tzw. uogólnionej negacji oraz założenia, że w pracy nie są przyjęte żadne założenia ontologiczne. Przyjęcie języka teorii mnogości jest już uprzywilejowaniem ontologii teoriomnogościowej.

The aim of this article is to reconstruct Bocheński’s method of philosophical analysis as well as to clarify the purpose of that method and its basic elements. In the second part of the paper I will compare Bocheński’s method with the methods of modern applied ontology.

Jaśkowski’s discussive logic D2 was formulated with the help of the modal logic S5 as follows (see [7, 8]): \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${A \in {D_{2}}}$$\end{document} iff \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\ulcorner\diamond{{A}^{\bullet}}\urcorner \in {\rm S}5}$$\end{document}, where (–)• is a translation of discussive formulae from Ford into the modal language. We say that a modal logic L defines D2 iff \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${{\rm D}_{2} = (...) \{A \in {\rm For^{\rm d}} : \ulcorner\diamond{{A}^{\bullet}}\urcorner \in {\it L}\}}$$\end{document}. In [14] and [10] were respectively presented the weakest normal and the weakest regular logic which (†): have the same theses beginning with ‘\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\diamond}$$\end{document}’ as S5. Of course, all logics fulfilling the above condition, define D2. In [10] it was prowed that in the cases of logics closed under congruence the following holds: defining D2 is equivalent to having the property (†). In this paper we show that this equivalence holds also for all modal logics which are closed under replacement of tautological equivalents (rte-logics).We give a general method which, for any class of modal logics determined by a set of joint axioms and rules, generates in the given class the weakest logic having the property (†). Thus, for the class of all modal logics we obtain the weakest modal logic which owns this property. On the other hand, applying the method to various classes of modal logics: rte-logics, congruential, monotonic, regular and normal, we obtain the weakest in a given class logic defining D2. (shrink)

Artykuł podejmuje zagadnienie relacji między językoznawstwem a logiką. Punktem wyjścia są dyskusje między logikami a językoznawcami, które miały miejsce w ostatnich kilkunastu latach. W artykule poddano analizie wzmiankowane dyskusje i wskazano, że faktycznie wkradają się w nie nieporozumienia; spróbowano również dokładniej określić domenę logiki i ukazać, że różni się ona zasadniczo od domenyjęzykoznawstwa.

Jaśkowski’s discussive logic D2 was formulated with the help of the modal logic S5 as follows (see [7, 8]): \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${A \in {D_{2}}}$$\end{document} iff \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\ulcorner\diamond{{A}^{\bullet}}\urcorner \in {\rm S}5}$$\end{document}, where (–)• is a translation of discussive formulae from Ford into the modal language. We say that a modal logic L defines D2 iff \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${{\rm D}_{2} = (...) \{A \in {\rm For^{\rm d}} : \ulcorner\diamond{{A}^{\bullet}}\urcorner \in {\it L}\}}$$\end{document}. In [14] and [10] were respectively presented the weakest normal and the weakest regular logic which (†): have the same theses beginning with ‘\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\diamond}$$\end{document}’ as S5. Of course, all logics fulfilling the above condition, define D2. In [10] it was prowed that in the cases of logics closed under congruence the following holds: defining D2 is equivalent to having the property (†). In this paper we show that this equivalence holds also for all modal logics which are closed under replacement of tautological equivalents (rte-logics).We give a general method which, for any class of modal logics determined by a set of joint axioms and rules, generates in the given class the weakest logic having the property (†). Thus, for the class of all modal logics we obtain the weakest modal logic which owns this property. On the other hand, applying the method to various classes of modal logics: rte-logics, congruential, monotonic, regular and normal, we obtain the weakest in a given class logic defining D2. (shrink)

The article reviews the book Osoba—fikcja czy rzeczywistość? Tożsamość i jedność ja w świetle badań neurologicznych [Persons: Fiction or Reality? The Identity and Unity of the “Self” in the Light of Neurological Research] 2nd ed., by Józef Bremer.

The article reviews the book Osoba—fikcja czy rzeczywistość? Tożsamość i jedność ja w świetle badań neurologicznych [Persons: Fiction or Reality? The Identity and Unity of the “Self” in the Light of Neurological Research] 2nd ed., by Józef Bremer.

The article reviews the book Osoba—fikcja czy rzeczywistość? Tożsamość i jedność ja w świetle badań neurologicznych [Persons: Fiction or Reality? The Identity and Unity of the “Self” in the Light of Neurological Research] 2nd ed., by Józef Bremer.

The article reviews the book of Jason Stanley, Know How. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.

The article reviews the book of Jason Stanley, Know How. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.

This paper analyses the concept of the relation of alternativity between possible worlds, the primary concept for relational semantics. We have focused only on epistemic and doxastic logics. The paper presents two approaches to these logics: J. Hintikka’s position and R. Stalnaker’s position.

An article is an introductory analysis of concept of religious belief in the language of logic. In its first part, there is a comparison of the concept of religious belief with the concept of scientific belief, next part is a presentation and analysis of Bocheński’s conception of rationality of religious beliefs, and the third part of article is an attempt of analysis of Aquinas conception of faith in the light of contemporary logic.

The article presents some problems of logical representation of belief change. The problem of beliefs (approached in a synchronic way) was analyzed on the ground of epistemic or intuitionist logics. In the 1980\'s works concerning logical reconstruction of belief change appeared. The basic conception here is the conception of belief change formulated by C. Alchouron, P. Gardenfors and D. Makinson (abbreviated as AGM), based on the assumption that the belief state is represented by a non-contradictory set of propositions and that (...) a belief change should be minimal (the postulate of economy). However, the AGM theory, characterized by a good formal shape, gives rise to several problems of the intuitive nature. Some of them are: the way the object of beliefs is understood, logical value of propositions that induce a change, the prepositional way of representing beliefs, putting beliefs in an order and the way this order is formally represented. (shrink)

In this article, it was first presented Moore’s paradox per se and after the author focused on the logical perspective — at first he analyzed these considerations in the field of so-called standard epistemic logic and after on the formal theory of belief change.

Artykuł prezentuje i komentuje dyskusję pomiędzy J. F. Drewnowskim a S. Kamińskim, której przedmiotem było stosowanie logiki w filozofii, a ściślej w metafizyce ogólnej o orientacji arystotelesowsko-tomistycznej. Drewnowski prezentował w niej stanowisko reprezentatywne dla tzw. Koła Krakowskiego o możliwości stosowania narzędzi logiki formalnej w metafizyce, Kamiński takiej możliwości zaprzeczał. Spróbujemy wskazać pewne wnioski z tej dyskusji przydatne dla dzisiejszego rozumienia stosowania logiki w filozofii. W końcowej partii podjęta jest próba znalezienia przyczyn stanowiska Kamińskiego, które jest reprezentatywne dla przedstawicieli tzw. lubelskiej (...) szkoły filozoficznej. (shrink)

The paper is devoted to an analysis of the concept of conversion in relation to the various concepts of faith distinguished by Robert Audi. The first part presents William James’ analysis of the concept of conversion, the biblical roots of the concept of conversion as epistrephō and metanoeō and analyses of conversion in the social sciences. The second part of the paper analyses the various notions of faith proposed in the works of Robert Audi. Finally, in the third part, I (...) analyse how conversion can be understood in relation to the main of the concepts of faith identified by Audi; I also relate the concept of faith to the concept of scientific revolution characterised in Thomas Kuhn’s theory of the development of science. (shrink)

The paper presents several attempts to express intuition concerning the understanding of knowledge and conviction by means of the conceptual apparatus of many-valued logic. J. Łoś’s pioneer system has been presented here, the system constructed by Ngoc Duc Ho. The internal logic in this system is used by the knowing subject as the three-valued logic of Łukasiewicz. The third logical value is understood as “unjustified” and the four-valued system of N. Belnap, the system that allows for the occurrence of propositions (...) which are evaluated both as true and false. (shrink)

Author: Nowik Andrzej Marek Title: WŁADYSŁAW TATARKIEWICZ’S HISTORIOGRAPHY FROM THE METHODOLOGICAL POLEMICS POINT OF VIEW (Historiografia Władysława Tatarkiewicza w kontekście sporów metodologicznych) Source: Filo-Sofija year: 2011, vol:.13/14, number: 2011/2-3, pages: 497-503 Keywords: WŁADYSŁAW TATARKIEWICZ, HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY, MODERN PHILOSOPHY, METHODOLOGY Discipline: PHILOSOPHY Language: POLISH Document type: ARTICLE Publication order reference (Primary author’s office address): E-mail: www:The purpose of this article is to show the main trends in philosophy that influenced Władyslaw Tatarkiewicz’s science research, with special consideration of neo-Kantianism (...) (the Marburg and the Baden Schools). Władysław Tatarkiewicz, one of the most significant polish historians of philosophy, rarely made comments on his preferred methods and on his concept of history of philosophy. Nevertheless, many of the methodological issues raised by Tatarkiewicz are focused on the problem of historical synthesis, at which the historian is obliged to make specific assessment concerning the subject matter of the research. Tatarkiewicz’s position on historiography indicates its relationship with remaining humanistic disciplines. (shrink)

For a complete Heyting lattice , we define a category Etale (). We show that the category Etale () is equivalent to the category of the sheaves over , Sh(), hence also with -valued sets, see [2], [1]. The category Etale() is a generalization of the category Etale (X), see [1], where X is a topological space.

In Jaśkowski’s model of discussion, discussive connectives represent certain interactions that can hold between debaters. However, it is not possible within the model for participants to use explicit modal operators. In the paper we present a modal extension of the discussive logic $\textbf{D}_{\textbf{2}}$ that formally corresponds to an extended version of Jaśkowski’s model of discussion that permits such a use. This logic is denoted by $\textbf{m}\textbf{D}_{\textbf{2}}$. We present philosophical motivations for the formulation of this logic. We also give syntactic characterizations (...) of the logic and propose a comparison with certain other modal systems. In particular, we prove that $\textbf{m}\textbf{D}_{\textbf{2}}$ is neither normal nor regular. On the basis of the axiomatization of $\textbf{D}_{\textbf{2}}$, we give an axiomatization of $\textbf{m}\textbf{D}_{\textbf{2}}$. We also give another axiomatization which is not based on the axiomatization of $\textbf{D}_{\textbf{2}}$. Furthermore, we give a natural Kripke-style semantics for $\textbf{m}\textbf{D}_{\textbf{2}}$ and prove the respective adequacy theorems. (shrink)

Building on our diverse research traditions in the study of reasoning, language and communication, the Polish School of Argumentation integrates various disciplines and institutions across Poland in which scholars are dedicated to understanding the phenomenon of the force of argument. Our primary goal is to craft a methodological programme and establish organisational infrastructure: this is the first key step in facilitating and fostering our research movement, which joins people with a common research focus, complementary skills and an enthusiasm to work (...) together. This statement—the Manifesto—lays the foundations for the research programme of the Polish School of Argumentation. (shrink)